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1 Introduction 
 
During the early decades of administrative computing, roughly 1950-1980, 
personal data was collected for a purpose, used for that purpose, and confined 
to 'silos'.  Only in particular circumstances did it escape beyond its original 
context, and become subjected to 're-purposing', and combination with data 
from other sources.  From the 1970s onwards, however, there was growth in the 
financial services sector's sharing of data about consumers' creditworthiness 
(Furletti 2002), and in data matching by government agencies (Clarke 1994c). 
 
Over the last few decades, these, initially exceptional, secondary uses of personal 
data have changed from a dribble to a haemorrhage, supported by advances in 
the technical capabilities necessary to handle large volumes of data.  The notions 
of 'data warehousing' (Inmon 1992) and 'data mining' (Fayyad et al. 1996) 
emerged.  After early disappointments, these ideas have recently resurged with 
the new marketing tags of 'big data', 'open data', 'data analytics' and 'data science'. 
 
During the early decades of data protection law, the fundamental principle was 
that use and disclosure beyond the original purpose of collection had to be based 
on consent or authority of law (OECD Use Limitation Principle, OECD 1980).  
The protection that this Principle was meant to afford has since been torn 
asunder by exemptions, exceptions and long lists of legal authorisations. 
 
In this paper, the short-form term 'expropriation' is adopted to refer to the kinds 
of secondary use that are common with big data / open data.  These enthusiastic 
movements are based on the application of data for purposes beyond the aims 
for which it was collected and is authorised by the individual to be used.   
In the public sector, governments around the world appear to have been inspired 
by the openness of Danish agencies' databases to secondary uses (e.g. Thygesen 
et al. 2011).  A practice is becoming more widespread in which all personal data 
that is gathered by government agencies, in many cases under compulsion, is 
regarded as the property of the State and "a strategic national resource that holds 
considerable value" (AG 2015).  The whole of government is treated as a 
monolith – thereby breaching the 'data silo' protection mechanism.   
 
In Australia, for example, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 
has pillaged data-sources across the healthcare sectors at national and state and 
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territory levels, and made rich sub-sets available to large numbers of researchers.  
Further, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has a multi-agency data 
integration program (MADIP) in train with a range of 'partner' agencies.  This 
extracts data gathered for specific administrative purposes and enables its analysis 
for a wide range of purposes.  A great many other such projects are being 
conducted and proposed under the big data and open data mantras.  Justifications 
for the abuses of data in government and in health-related research emphasise 
collectivism and de-value individualism.   
 
The private sector is piggybacking on the 'open data' notion (e.g. Deloitte 2012).  
Corporations are encouraged by governments to treat data about individuals as 
an exploitable asset, irrespective of its origins, sensitivity and re-identifiability.  
Assertions of business value, and that such activities are good for the economy, 
are treated as being of greater importance than human values. 
  
In both sectors, proponents and practitioners make the assumption that such 
projects are capable of delivering significant benefits, even though tha data has 
been wrenched far beyond its original context, has been merged with other data 
with little attention paid to incompatibilities of meaning and quality, and has been 
analysed for purposes very different from those for which it was collected.  
Limited attention is paid to data quality audit and even less to testing of the 
inferences drawn from such data-collections against real-world patterns (Clarke 
2016b).  Considerable scepticism is necessary about the real effectiveness and 
social value of these activities. 
 
The doubts extend beyond the activities' justification to the negative impacts on 
the individuals whose data is expropriated.  Proponents of big data do not object 
to replacing identifiers with pseudonyms;  but they do not welcome 
comprehensive privacy protection:  "it is difficult to ensure the dataset does not 
allow subsequent re-identification of individuals, but ... it is also difficult to de-
identify datasets without introducing bias into those sets that can lead to spurious 
results" (Angiuli et al. 2015).  Significantly for the argument pursued in this paper, 
the position adopted by big-data proponents is that the interests of the 
individuals to whom the expropriated data relates are secondary, and that such 
procedures as are applied to reduce the risk of harm to individuals' privacy must 
be at limited cost to its utility for organisations. 
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Examples of the claim for supremacy of the data-utility value over the privacy 
value abound.  For example, "we underline the necessity of an appropriate 
research exemption from consent for the use of sensitive personal data in medical 
research ..." (Mostert et al. 2016, emphasis added)  More generally, "We develop 
a method that allows the release of [individually identifiable microdata] while 
minimizing information loss and, at the same time, providing a degree of 
preventive protection to the data subjects" (Garfinkel et al. 2007, p.23, emphasis 
added). 
 
The theme for the Bled conference in 2019 is 'Humanising Technology for a 
Sustainable Society'.  This paper addresses that theme by proposing a switch back 
from the asserted supremacy of data utility to recognition of the primacy of the 
human right of privacy.  It is not argued that data utility should be ignored.  The 
proposition is that, when preparing personal data for disclosure and use beyond 
its original context, the appropriate value to adopt as the objective is privacy 
protection.  The retention of such utility as the data may have for other purposes 
is not the objective.  It remains, however, an important factor to be considered 
in the choice among alternative ways of ensuring that harm is precluded from 
arising from re-identification of the data. 
 
The paper commences with a summary of privacy concerns arising from the 
expropriation of personal data and its use and disclosure for purposes far beyond 
the context within which it was collected.  The notions of identification, de-
identification and re-identification are outlined, and conventional techniques 
described.  This builds on a long series of prior research projects by the author.  
De-identification is shown to be a seriously inadequate privacy-protection 
measure.  Two appropriate approaches are identified:  synthetic data, and Known 
Irreversible Record Falsification (KIRF). 
 
The paper's contributions are the review of de-identification measures from the 
perspective of the affected individuals rather than of the expropriating parties, 
and the specification of falsification as a necessary criterion for plundered data-
sets. 
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2 The Vital Role of Data Privacy 
 
Privacy is a pivotal value, reflected in a dozen Articles of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966).  It underpins many of the 
rights that are vital constituents of freedom. Fuller discussion is in Clarke (2014c).  
Philosophical analyses of privacy are often based on such precepts as human 
dignity, integrity, individual autonomy and self-determination, and commonly 
slide into conflicts between the moral and legal notions of 'rights'.  Adding to the 
confusion, legal rights vary significantly across jurisdictions.  A practical working 
definition is as follows (Morison 1973, Clarke 1997): 
 
Privacy is the interest that individuals have in sustaining 'personal space', free from 
interference by other people and organisations 
 
The diversity of contexts within which privacy concerns arise is addressed by 
typologies that identify dimensions or types of privacy (Clarke 1997, Finn et al. 
2013, Koops et al. 2016).  The dimensions of privacy of personal data and of 
personal communications are directly relevant to the present topic.  The term 
'information privacy' is commonly used to encompass both data at rest and on 
the move, and is usefully defined as follows: 
 
Information privacy is the interest that individuals have in controlling, or at least 
significantly influencing, the handling of data about themselves. 
 
Protection of information privacy is not only important in its own right.  It also 
provides crucial underpinning for protections of the other three dimensions:  
privacy of personal behaviour, of personal experience, and of the physical person.  
 
Abuse of the privacy interest results in significant harm to human values.  Within 
communities, psychological harm and negative impacts on social cohesion are 
associated with loss of control over one's life and image, loss of respect, and 
devaluation of the individual.  Reputational harm inflicted by the disclosure of 
data about stigmatised behaviours, whether of the individual or of family-
members, reduces the pool of people prepared to stand for political office and 
hence weakens the polity.  Profiling, and use of data-collections to discover 
behaviour-patterns and generate suspicion, lay the foundation for the repression 
of behaviours that powerful organisations regard as undesirable.  This 
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undermines the exposure of wasteful, corrupt and otherwise illegal activities, and 
reduces the scope for creativity in economic, social, cultural and political 
contexts.  At any given time, a proportion of the population is at risk of being 
identified and located by a person or organisation that wishes to take revenge 
against them or exact retribution from them, excite mortal fear in them, or 
eliminate them. 
 
Behavioural privacy is harmed not only from unjustified collection, use and 
disclosure of personal data, but also from the knowledge or suspicion that 
individuals may be watched, that data may be collected, and that their activities 
may be monitored.  This has a 'chilling effect' on group behaviour, whereby 
intentional acts by one party have a strong deterrent effect on important, positive 
behaviours of some other party (Schauer 1978).  This results in stultification of 
social and political speech. A society in which non-conformist, inventive and 
innovative behaviour are stifled risks becoming static and lacking in cultural, 
economic and scientific change (Kim 2004). 
 
Data sensitivity is relative.  Firstly, it depends on the personal values of the 
individual concerned, which are influenced by such factors as their cultural 
context, ethnicity, lingual background, family circumstances, wealth, and political 
roles.  Secondly, it depends on the individual's circumstances at any particular 
point in time, which affects what they want to hide, such as family history, prior 
misdemeanours, interests, attitudes, life-style, assets, liabilities, or details of their 
family or family life. 
 
Various aspects of privacy are important, in particular circumstances, for a 
substantial proportion of the population. Some categories of individual are more 
highly vulnerable than others.  For the large numbers of people who at any given 
time fall within the many categories of 'persons-at-risk', it is essential to guard 
against the disclosure of a great deal of data, much of it seemingly innocuous 
(GFW 2011, Clarke 2014a). 
 
To assist in assessment of the effectiveness of safeguards against harm arising 
from data expropriation, Table 1 presents a small suite of test-cases that are 
sufficiently diverse to capture some of the richness of human needs. 
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Table 1: Six 'Persons-at-Risk' Test-Cases 
 
• People with outlier, non-conformist or 'deviant' personal 
profiles 
Key Data:  characteristics of interest to service-providers 
Key Risks: denial of service 
e.g. genetic or medical conditions resulting in discrimination by 
health insurers, low 'social credit' scores resulting in denial of 
access to transport 
• Negotiators of corporate mergers and acquisitions 
Key Data:  information-sources, locations, meeting-partners 
Key Risks: breach of corporations law and stock exchange listing 
rules 
• Candidates for political office 
Key Data:    associations with stigmas such as psychiatric 
treatment 
Key Risks:   unelectability, reduction in the pool of candidates 
• Whistleblowers and media sources 
Key Data:    identity 
Key Risks:   retribution, drying-up of informers, unchecked 
corruption 
• Victims of domestic violence 
Key Data:   location  
Key Risks:   physical harm 
• Police informants and protected witnesses 
Key Data:    pseudonym and/or location 
Key Risks:   physical harm, loss of witness, loss of future 
witnesses 
 
This paper's purpose is to switch the focus away from the asserted utility of big 
and open data for secondary purposes, and back towards the human value of 
privacy.  However, there are further aspects of the conference theme of 
'Humanising Technology for a Sustainable Society' that are negatively affected by 
the prevalence of data expropriation. 
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Many organisations' operations depend on access to personal data, and on the 
quality of that data.  For an analysis of data quality aspects in big data contexts, 
see Clarke (2016b).  The goodwill of the individuals concerned is very important 
not only to data access and data quality, but also to the cost incurred in assuring 
data quality. Extraneous uses of personal data cause a significant decrease in trust 
by individuals in the organisations that they deal with.  The result is that they are 
much less willing to disclose and much more likely to hide and to obscure data, 
and much less willing to disclose honestly, and much more likely to disclose 
selectively, inconsistently, vaguely, inaccurately, misleadingly, imaginatively or 
fraudulently.  There is a great deal of scope for obfuscation and falsification of 
data (Schneier 2015a, 2015b, Bösch et al. 2016, Clarke 2016a).  Widespread 
exercise of these techniques will have serious negative consequences for the 
quality of data held by organisations. 
 
Expropriation of data results in the data on which analyses are based bearing a 
less reliable relationship to the real-world phenomena that they nominally 
represent.  This leads to the inferences that are drawn by medical, criminological 
and social research in the interests of the public, and by marketing activities in 
the interests of corporations, being at best misled and misleading, and their use 
being harmful rather than helpful.  This particular form of dehumanising 
technology, rather than contributing to the sustainability of society, undermines 
it. 
 
This section has presented the reasons why privacy is a vital human value.  The 
proposal that privacy is the primary objective and data-utility the constraint is 
therefore of far more than merely academic interest, and is a social and economic 
need.  The following section outlines the relevant aspects of identification, and 
the conventional mechanisms that have been applied to expropriated data in 
order to achieve what designers have portrayed as being 'anonymisation' of the 
data. 
 
3 De- and Re-Identification 
 
This section outlines the notions of identity, nymity and identification, drawing 
on Clarke (1994b, 2010).  It presents the conditions that need to be fulfilled in 
order that de-identification can be achieved, and re-identification precluded.  It 
then provides an overview of techniques applied to expropriated personal data.  
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3.1 Concepts 
 
An entity is a real-world thing.  Rather than artefacts such as tradeable items and 
mobile phones, this paper is concerned with human beings.  An identity is an 
entity of virtual rather than physical form. Each person may present many 
identities to different people and organisations, and in different contexts, 
typically associated with roles such as consumer, student, employee, parent and 
volunteer. During recent decades, organisations have co-opted the term 'identity' 
to refer to something that they create and that exists in machine-readable storage. 
Better terms exist to describe that notion, in particular digital persona (Clarke 
1994a, 2014b).  In this paper, the term 'identity' is used only to refer to 
presentations of an entity, not to digital personae. 
 
The notion of 'nymity' is concerned with identities that are not associated with 
an entity.  In the case of anonymity, the identity cannot be associated with any 
particular entity, whether from the data itself, or by combining it with other data. 
On the other hand, pseudonymity applies where the identity is not obviously 
associated with any particular entity, but association may be possible if legal, 
organisational and technical constraints are overcome (Clarke 1999). 
 
An identifier is a data-item or set of data-items that represent attributes that can 
reliably distinguish an identity from others in the same category.  Commonly, a 
human identity is identified by name (including context-dependent names such 
as 'Sally' or 'Herbert' at a service-counter or in a call-centre), or by an identifying 
code that has been assigned by an organisation (such as an employee- or 
customer-number). 
 
Identification is the process whereby a transaction or a stored data-record is 
associated with a particular identity. This is achieved by acquiring an identifier, 
or assigning one, such as a person's name or an identifying code. 
 
De-identification notionally refers to a process whereby a transaction or a 
stored data-record becomes no longer associable with a particular identity.  
However, it is in practice subject to a number of interpretations, outlined in Table 
2. 
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Table 2: Alternative Interpretations of 'De-Identification' 
 
1. The removal of data-items that are designed to, or are known 
to, facilitate the association of a record with a real-world identity.  
This interpretation is the one most commonly apparent in the 
literature.  It satisfies a necessary condition, but falls a long way 
short of being sufficient 
2. Further adaption and/or 'perturbation' of the data-set in 
order to address additional association risks.  These are 
discovered by analysis of the data and its various contexts in 
order to achieve understanding of the many other ways in which 
at least some proportion of the records may remain associable 
with a particular real-world identity.  This interpretation is 
sometimes apparent in the literature 
3. Further processing of the data-set to address the risk of 
physical or virtual merger, linkage or comparison of that 
data-set with other data-sets.  This interpretation is seldom 
apparent in the literature 
4. Demonstration of the reliability of de-identification, by 
showing that the records in the data-set cannot be associated 
with the real-world identity to whom they originally applied.  
This interpretation is seldom apparent in the literature 
 
De-identification of a data-set is very likely to result in at least some degree of 
compromise to the data-set's utility for secondary purposes.  In Culnane et al. 
(2017), it is argued that "decreasing the precision of the data, or perturbing it 
statistically, makes re-identification gradually harder at a substantial cost to 
utility".  It remains an open question as to whether, under what circumstances, 
and to what extent, the objectives of the two sets of stakeholders can be 
reconciled.  For early examinations of the trade-off between de-identification 
and the utility of the data-set, see Duncan et al. (2001), Brickell & Shmatikov 
(2009) and Friedman & Schuster (2010).  The perception of compromise to data 
utility appears to be an important reason why the more powerful de-identification 
techniques in Table 2 are seldom actually applied, or at least not with the 
enormous care necessary to achieve significant privacy-protection. 
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In many circumstances, de-identified records are subject to 're-identification', 
that is to say the re-discovery or inference of an association between a record and 
a real-world identity, despite prior attempts to de-identify them.  This is possible 
because de-identification is extremely difficult for all but the simplest and least 
interesting data-sets.  It is particularly easy with rich data-sets, such as those 
whose records contain many data-items, or whose data-items contain unusual 
values. 
   
Further, a great many of the data-sets that are lifted out of their original context 
and re-purposed are subsequently merged or linked with other data-sets.  This 
gives rise to two further phenomena, which together greatly increase the risk of 
inappropriate matches and inappropriate inferences (Clarke 2018): 
 
• combined data-sets generally offer even more opportunities for re-
identification than do single-source data-sets;  and 
• combined data-sets are far more likely than single-source data-sets to 
lead to faulty inferences being drawn.  This is because: 
o the quality of the data in each of the data-sets is often not high 
and hence comparisons of data-content may be unreliable; 
o the meanings of the data-items in each of the data-sets are often 
unclear or ambiguous; 
o the definitions of the data-items in each of the data-sets may be 
inconsistent or otherwise incompatible;  and 
o where data scrubbing activities have been undertaken, before 
and/or after combination of the data-sets, the process(es) of 
addressing some problems inevitably also create new problems. 
 
The notion of re-identification has attracted considerable attention, particularly 
since it was demonstrated that "87% ... of the population in the United States 
had reported characteristics that likely made them unique based only on {5-digit 
ZIP, gender, date of birth}. About half of the U.S. population ... are likely to be 
uniquely identified by only {place, gender, date of birth}, where place is basically 
the city, town, or municipality in which the person resides" (Sweeney 2000).  
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Narayanan & Shmatikov (2008) presented a general de-anonymization algorithm 
which they claimed requires "very little background knowledge (as few as 5-10 
attributes in our case study).  Our de-anonymization algorithm is robust to 
imprecision of the adversary’s background knowledge and to sanitization or 
perturbation that may have been applied to the data prior to release. It works 
even if only a subset of the original dataset has been published" (p.2).  For fuller 
discussion of re-identification, see Ohm (2010) and Slee (2011). 
 
3.2 Longstanding De-Identification Techniques 
 
In response to objections to the expropriation of personal data, proponents argue 
that the records are 'anonymised', can no longer be associated with the individual 
concerned, can therefore do that individual no harm, and hence the individual 
should not be concerned about the re-use or disclosure of the data.  In order to 
deliver what they claim to be 'anonymised data', expropriating organisations have 
applied a variety of techniques. 
  
From the 'data mining' phase (indicatively 1980-2005), a literature exists on 
'privacy-preserving data mining' (PPDM – Denning 1980, Sweeney 1996, 
Agrawal & Srikant 2000).  For a literature review, see Brynielsson et al. (2013).  
PPDM involves suppressing all identifiers and other data-items likely to enable 
re-identification ('quasi-identifiers'), and editing and/or statistically randomising 
(or 'perturbing') the contents of data-items whose content may assist re-
identification (e.g. because of unusual values).  The declared purpose is to 
preserve the overall statistical features of the data, while achieving a lower 
probability of revealing private information. 
   
During the later 'big data' phase (since c. 2010), guidance on forms of data 
manipulation that are suitable for practical application is provided in particular 
by UKICO (2012), but see also DHHS (2012).  In Slee (2011), a simple set of 
four categories is suggested:  replacement, suppression, generalisation and 
perturbation.  Accessible summaries of the challenges and some of the risks 
involved in the de-identification process are in Garfinkel (2015) and Polonetsky 
et al. (2016).   
The regulatory regime applying to US health records (HIPAA) specifies two 
alternative approaches for de-identification:  The Expert Determination Method 
and the Safe Harbor method (which is effectively a simplified 'fool's guide').  
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However, "neither method promises a foolproof method of de-identification 
with zero risk of re-identification. Instead, the methods are intended to be 
practical approaches to allow de-identified healthcare information to be created 
and shared with a low risk of re-identification" (Garfinkel 2015, p. 22). 
 
In D'Acquisto et al. (2015) pp.27-37, it is noted that "most data releasers today 
(e.g. national statistical offices) tend to adopt the utility-first approach, because 
delivering useful data is their raison d'etre" (p.29, emphasis added). A further 
indication of the strong commitment to data utility is that, although "in Germany, 
any organizational data accessible to external researchers is required to be de 
facto anonymized", the bar is set very low, because all that is required is that "the 
effort that is necessary to identify a single unit in the data set is higher than the actual 
benefit the potential intruder would gain by the identification" (Bleninger et al., 
2010, emphasis added).  This formulation ignores the critical issues that (1) the 
breach causes harm to the affected individual, and (2) the harm to the affected 
individual may be far greater than the benefit to the breacher. 
   
Similarly, the de-identification decision-making framework in O'Keefe et al. 
(2017) remains committed to the utility-first approach, because it applies the 
threshold test of "when data is sufficiently de-identified given [the organisation's] data 
situation" (p.2, emphasis added). 
 
A further indicator of the inadequacy of the approaches adopted is that 're-
identification risk' is regarded as being merely "the percentage of de-identified 
records that can be re-identified" (Garfinkel 2015, p. 38).  If privacy rather than 
utility is adopted as the objective, then 're-identification risk' is seen to be a much 
more complex construct, because every breach has to be evaluated according to 
the potential harm it gives rise to – which can be severe in the case of a wide 
range of categories of persons-at-risk. 
 
Garfinkel's conclusion was that, "after more than a decade of research, there 
is comparatively little known about the underlying science of de-
identification" (2015, p.39).  Given the complexities involved in both the 
problems and the techniques, it is far from clear that any practical solutions will 
ever emerge that satisfy the privacy-first rather than the utility-first criterion. 
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3.3 Re-Identification Techniques 
 
The application of de-identification techniques naturally stimulated responses:  
"it seems that new techniques for de-identifying data have been met with equally 
innovative attempts at re-identification" (Hardy & Maurushat 2017, p.32).  For 
analyses of techniques for re-identification, see Sweeney (2002), Acquisti & 
Gross (2009) and Ohm (2010). 
 
In relation to one critical area of concern, the re-identifiability of location and 
tracking data, Song et al. (2014) showed that "human mobility traces are highly 
identifiable with only a few spatio-temporal points" (p.19).  Further, de De 
Montjoye et al. (2015) found that credit card records with "four spatiotemporal 
points are enough to uniquely reidentify 90% of individuals ... [and] knowing the 
price of a transaction increases the risk of reidentification by 22%" (p. 536). 
Culnane et al. (2017) and Teague et al. (2017) described successful re-
identification of patients in a de-identified open health dataset. 
   
In contesting the De Montjoye et al. findings, Sanchez et al. (2016) provided a 
complex analysis, concluding that "sound anonymization methodologies exist to 
produce useful anonymized data that can be safely shared ...".  It is inconceivable 
that the intellectual effort brought to bear by those authors in defending 
disclosure would or even could ever be applied to the continual, high-volume 
disclosures that are part-and-parcel of the data expropriation economy: "De-
identification is not an exact science and ... you will not be able to avoid the need 
for complex judgement calls about when data is sufficiently de-identified given 
your [organisation's] data situation" (O'Keefe et al. 2017, p.2).  The practical 
conclusion is that, at least where privacy is prioritised over data-utility: 
 
Sound anonymization methodologies are so complex and onerous that they cannot be relied upon 
to produce useful anonymized data that can be safely shared 
 
The re-identification process is easier where: 
 
1. the data-set contains a large number of data-items; 
2. there are unique values within individual data-items;  and/or  
3. there are unique combinations of values across multiple data-items.   
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A further important consideration is the availability of multiple data-sets that are 
capable of being compared, which gives rise to greater richness in a combined or 
merged data-set.  An important factor in successful de-identification activities has 
been the widespread availability of large data-sets, such as electoral rolls, 
subscription lists, profiles on social networking sites, and the wide range of data 
broker offerings.  In short, a great many expropriated data-sets satisfy the 
conditions for easy re-identification of a material proportion of the records 
they contain. 
 
3.4 Recent De-Identification Techniques 
 
The D'Acquisto monograph describes more privacy-protective techniques that 
have been proposed by academics – although most of them appear to be 
encountering difficulty in escaping the laboratory.  The monograph refers to the 
alternative techniques as 'privacy-first anonymisation', but use of that term is not 
justified.  The formulation is still utility-as-objective and privacy-as-constraint:  "a 
parameter ... guarantees an upper bound on the re-identification disclosure risk 
and perhaps also on the attribute disclosure risk".  Further, even in academic 
experimentation, the privacy-protectiveness has been set low, due to "parameter 
choices relaxing privacy in order for reasonable utility to be attainable" (p.29, 
emphasis added). 
 
The D'Acquisto et al. summary of the 'privacy models' underlying these 
techniques is as follows: "A first family includes k-anonymity and its extensions 
taking care of attribute disclosure, like p-sensitive k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-
closeness, (n,t)-closeness, and others. The second family is built around the 
notion of differential privacy, along with some variants like crowd-blending 
privacy or BlowFish" (D'Acquisto et al. 2015, p.30). 
 
The k-anonymity proposition is a framework for quantifying the amount of 
manipulation required of quasi-identifiers in order to achieve a given level of 
privacy (Sweeney 2002).  A data-set satisfies k-anonymity iff each sequence of 
values in any quasi-identifier appears with at least k occurrences. Bigger k is 
better.  The technique addresses only some of the threats, and has been subjected 
to many variants and extensions in an endeavour to address further threats. 
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Differential privacy is a set of mathematical techniques that reduces the risk of 
disclosure by adding non-deterministic noise to the results of mathematical 
operations before the results are reported. An algorithm is differentially private 
if the probability of a given output is only marginally affected if one record is 
removed from the dataset (Dwork 2006, 2008). 
 
In both cases, "The goal is to keep the data 'truthful' and thus provide good utility 
for data-mining applications, while achieving less than perfect privacy" (Brickell & 
Shmatikov 2009, p.8, emphasis added).  Further, the techniques depend on 
assumptions about the data, about other data that may be available, the attacker, 
the attacker's motivations, and the nature of the attack.  Some of the claims made 
for the techniques have been debunked (e.g. Narayanan & Shmatikov 2010, Zang 
& Bolot 2011, Narayanan & Felten 2016, Zook et al. 2017, Ashgar & Kaafar 
2019), and a range of statistical attacks is feasible (O’Keefe & Chipperfield 2013, 
pp. 441-451).  All k-anonymity and differential privacy techniques provide 
very limited protection. 
 
Even if these highly complex techniques did prove to satisfy the privacy-first 
criterion, the excitement that they have given rise to in some academic circles has 
not been matched in the real world of data expropriation, and it appears unlikely 
that they ever would be.  None of the techniques, nor even combinations of 
multiples of them, actually achieve the objective of privacy-protection – not least 
because their aim is the retention of the data's utility.  The highest standard 
achieved within the data-utility-first tradition, even in the more advanced, but 
seldom implemented forms, might be reasonably described as 'mostly de-
identified' or 'moderately perturbed'.   
 
The data-utility-first approach, and the de-identification techniques that it has 
spawned, cannot deliver adequate privacy protection.  The expropriation of 
personal data gives rise to harm to people generally, and is particularly threatening 
to person-at-risk such as the small suite of test-cases in Table 1.  Addressing their 
needs requires another approach entirely. 
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4 Privacy-First Disarming of Expropriated Data-Sets 
 
This section considers ways in which privacy can be prioritised, but, within that 
constraint, such utility as is feasible can be rescued from data-sets.  Although it 
is unusual for researchers to treat privacy as the objective and economic benefits 
as the constraint, it is not unknown.  For example, in Li & Sarkar (2007), "The 
proposed method attempts to preserve the statistical properties of the data based 
on privacy protection parameters specified by the organization" (p.254).  Privacy 
is thereby defined as the objective, and the statistical value of the data the 
constraint ("attempts to preserve"). 
   
In another approach, Jändel (2014) describes a process for analysing the risk of 
re-identification, and determining whether a given threshold ("the largest 
acceptable de-anonymisation probability for the attack scenario") is exceeded.  
When the safety of victims of domestic violence and protected witnesses is taken 
into account, that threshold has to be formulated at the level of impossibility of 
discovery of the person's identity and/or location.  It is therefore reasonable to 
treat Jändel's extreme case as being privacy-protective. 
 
In order to provide adequate protection against privacy breaches arising from 
expropriated data-sets even after de-identification, two approaches are possible: 
 
1. Avoid the risks, by not using empirical data, but instead generating 
synthetic data 
2. Prevent the risks arising, by ensuring that, even where individual records 
are re-identified, the data is unusable because it has been falsified in ways 
the specifics of which are unknowable, and which are irreversible 
 
The remainder of this section considers those two approaches. 
 
4.1 Synthetic Data 
 
The most obvious way in which privacy can be protected is by not expropriating 
data, and hence avoiding use and disclosure for secondary purposes.  This need 
not deny the extraction of utility from the data.  Under a variety of circumstances, 
it is feasible to create 'synthetic data' that does not disclose data that relates to 
any individual, but that has "characteristics that are similar to real-world data 
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[with] frequency and error distributions of values [that] follow real-world 
distributions, and dependencies between attributes [that are] modelled 
accurately" (Christen & Pudjijono 2009. p.507). 
 
This has been argued by some to be an effective solution to the problem:  
"empirically, it is difficult to find a database table on which sanitization permits 
both privacy and utility. Any incremental utility gained by non-trivial sanitization 
(as opposed to simply removing quasi-identifiers or sensitive attributes) is more 
than offset by a decrease in privacy, measured as the adversarial sensitive attribute 
disclosure. It is possible, however, to construct an artificial database, for which 
sanitization provides both complete utility and complete privacy, even for the 
strongest definition of privacy ..." (Brickell & Shmatikov 2009, p.7). 
 
To date, there appears to have been very little take-up of this approach.  As 
abuses of personal data, and harm arising from them, become increasingly 
apparent to the public, the assumed power of national statistical and other 
government agencies and large corporations may be shaken, and the generation 
of synthetic data may become much more attractive. 
 
4.2 Empirical Data, De-Fanged 
 
In this case, the proposition is that no data-set can be expropriated beyond its 
original context unless it has been first rendered valueless for any purpose relating 
to the administration of relationships between organisations and particular 
individuals. One way of achieving this is to convert all record-level data that was 
once empirical – in the sense of being drawn from and reflecting attributes of 
real-world phenomena – into synthetic data that represents a plausible 
phenomenon, but not a real one. 
 
The underlying data-set is of course not affected, and remains in the hands of 
the organisation that manages it.  The underlying data-set is the appropriate basis 
for administering the relationships between organisations and particular 
individuals;  whereas expropriated data-sets are not. 
 
The process must also be irreversible, at the level of each individual data record. 
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Further, the fact of processing (as distinct from the details), and the 
standards achieved: 
 
• must be known by organisations that do or may gain access to the 
expropriated data-sets. This ensures that they are aware that the 
record-level data, whether or not it can be associated with any particular 
person, is unusable for any purpose related to the individual;  and 
• must be known by affected individuals, and by advocacy 
organisations for their interests. This ensures confidence in the 
process, and avoids motivating people to obfuscate or falsify data about 
themselves 
 
Combining these properties, this mechanism is usefully described as Known 
Irreversible Record Falsification (KIRF). 
 
The possibility exists that the characteristics of some data-sets, or of some 
records within them, may resist falsification to the point of unusability.  In that 
case, the records in question are unsuitable for expropriation, and no empirical 
derivative of them may be disclosed.  If those records constitute a sufficient 
proportion of the data-set as a whole, then the data-set as a whole cannot be 
disclosed. 
 
Examples of data-sets that may contain records that are too rich to be effectively 
falsified include the combination of psychological and social data with 
stigmatised medical conditions, and data about undercover operatives in national 
security and law enforcement contexts.  (This of course does not necessarily 
preclude the use of statistical distributions derived from such data-sets as a basis 
for generating synthetic data that has comparable overall characteristics).  
 
A corollary of the privacy-first approach is that the utility of the data-set is a 
constraint, not an objective.  This might seem to rob the expropriated data-set 
of a great deal of value.  Intuitively, it would appear unlikely that any single 
process could achieve both the standard of 'irreversibly falsified records' and 
preservation of the original data-set's overall statistical features.  On the other 
hand, for any given use to which the expropriated data-set is to be put, different 
falsification processes could be applied, in order to produce a data-set that 
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preserves the particular statistical features that are critical for that particular 
analysis. 
 
In most circumstances, it would appear likely that changes can be made to data 
in order to satisfy the criteria, while sustaining at least a moderate level of utility 
for particular purposes.  This is an empirical question that cannot be determined 
in the abstract, but requires detailed analysis in each specific context of data-set 
and purpose. 
 
A less stringent approach could be considered, whereby the 'every record' 
requirement is relaxed, in favour of 'enough records'.  However, because many 
records are not falsified, the data-set's utility for making decisions about 
individuals is not undermined and hence adversaries are motivated to conduct 
attacks.  Individuals whose records are not falsified are subject to compromise.  
This is a serious matter, because inevitably some of them would be among the 
categories of persons-at-risk.  The inadequacy extends further, however, because 
the interests of all individuals are compromised.  Records that have been falsified 
are also likely to be used to generate inferences – and, due to the falsification 
steps, the inferences that are drawn are unreliable, and potentially harmful. 
 
The less stringent arrangement would fail to curb the eagerness of organisations 
to exploit the expropriated data-set, and would fail to earn the trust of the 
affected individuals.  Even if the application of a particular record's content to a 
particular individual were to be precluded by law, the scope for unregulated abuse 
of the provision is too high.  The Known Irreversible Falsification criterion needs 
to be applied to all records, not merely to some or even most records. 
 
5 Towards an Evaluation Process for the Privacy-First Approach 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to argue for a privacy-first approach to the 
preparation of data-sets for expropriation to secondary purposes, and to develop 
an operational definition of what that involves.  This section provides some 
preliminary suggestions as to the steps necessary to apply the principles, 
operationalise the process, and assess its effectiveness. 
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The term 'privacy-first' is of recent origin, and its first use in D'Acquisto et al. 
(2015, p.29) was in any case a false start.  The sense in which it is proposed in 
this paper is so far outside the present mainstream as to be arguably deviant.  
Searches for existing literature on data perturbation undertaken to satisfy the 
requirement of falsification have not located a literature on the topic, or even 
individual instances that adopt the approach.  Further, in the absence of 
theoretical discussions, it is not likely that exemplars and testbeds can be readily 
found. 
 
On the other hand, some prior work is very likely to have relevance, in the sense 
of being capable of adaptation to the privacy-first criterion.  A simple example 
of this would be a model in which a parameterisation mechanism enables the 
privacy weighting to be set at 1, but that nonetheless delivers non-zero utility, or 
at least information or insights.  An approach to generating action in this field 
would be to expose these ideas in workshops that focus on de-identification and 
re-identification topics. 
 
It is also feasible for projects to be undertaken that commence with existing 
guidelines on data perturbation, apply the Known Irreversible Record 
Falsification (KIRF) principle, and test the results by considering the 6 test-cases 
in Table 1.  Initial projects might use data-sets of convenience.  More serious 
studies would then be needed on mainstream, rich data-sets, such as those in the 
Census, social data and health care fields that are commonly subjected to 
expropriation. 
 
Once the point has been reached that multiple approaches have been specified 
that satisfy the requirement, further rounds of research are needed in order to 
establish principles and practical guidance in relation to the retention of maximal 
utility, while still satisfying the requirement of known irreversible falsification for 
all individual records. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
This paper's purposes have been: 
 
• to abandon the utility-first approach; 
• to adopt privacy as the objective and relegate data-utility to the level of 
a constraint; 
• to argue for data-expropriation beyond its original context to be 
contingent on the prior application of techniques that fulfil that 
requirement;  and 
• to identify and articulate specific ways in which this can be done. 
 
The analysis of alternative criteria for achieving privacy-first disarming of data-
sets identified two contenders.  The first possibility is the use only of synthentic 
data.  This avoids the disclosure of any personal data, by creating and disclosing 
data whose distribution has usefully close approximations to the original data, 
but without any scope for disclosure of any personal data relating to any actual 
identity. 
The second possibility applies the Known Irreversible Record Falsification 
(KIRF) criterion, in order to achieve similar properties in a released data-set to 
those of synthetic data.  This achieves privacy protection by ensuring that all 
records are unusable for any purpose that relates to any specific individual.  KIRF 
will, however, have impacts on the utility of data-sets.  These impacts may be 
modest, but will often be significant, and in some circumstances will render the 
data-set unusable for data analytics purposes. 
 
An implication of this conclusion is that research into de-identification processes 
needs to shift away from the approaches adopted over the last 15 years, such as 
k-anonymity and differential privacy, which prioritise utility at the expense of 
privacy. Instead, the need is for a focus on ways to minimise the harm to the 
utility of data-sets, given that every record has to be falsified in such a 
manner that it is unusable for determinations about individuals, and is 
known to be so. 
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If data-expropriating organisations fail to switch their approach in this way, it will 
be increasingly apparent to the public that their personal data is being 
expropriated and exploited by organisations without meaningful regard for either 
the rights of individuals or the harm that may arise from re-identification.  As 
one research team in the re-identification area put it, "The ... government holds 
vast quantities of information about [individuals].  It is not really 'government 
data'.   It is data about people, entrusted to the government’s care" (Culnane et 
al. 2017). 
   
A proportion of the population will neither know nor care.  A further proportion 
will know, and care, but feel themselves to be technically incapable and/or 
powerless to do anything about it, sullenly accept the situation, and trust 
organisations as little as possible.  The remainder will take action in order to deny 
the use of their data.  Many techniques are already been demonstrated whereby 
individuals can resist abuse of their data, and moderate numbers of tools for 
obfuscation and falsification are available for deployment. 
   
Over the last 50 years, organisations' data-gathering techniques have migrated 
from manual capture by employees to a combination of manual capture by the 
individuals to whom the data relates and automated capture as a byproduct of 
transactional activities.  There is increasing incidence of autonomous creation of 
data by equipment that individuals are not aware are monitoring their behaviour.  
Obfuscation and falsification are easiest in relation to the long-standing forms of 
data capture.  There are interesting challenges aplenty in devising ways to avoid, 
subvert and defeat byproduct and autonomous data capture.  The expertise of 
many capable individuals will be attracted to the endeavour. 
 
If this scenario unfolds, the quality of data that is in the expropriated collections 
will diminish below its present mediocre level.  This will have serious implications 
for the validity, and for the business and policy value, of inferences drawn from 
data analytics activities.  The benefits to economies and societies arising from this 
scenario will be significantly less than what would be achieved if instead the 
privacy-first approaches advocated above are adopted.  This paper thereby 
contributes to the aim of humanising technologies for sustainable society. 
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